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The paper performs an efficiency analysis of the lower secondary school sector in Norway. 
The efficiency potential is calculated to 14 percent based on a DEA analysis with grades in 
core subjects (adjusted for student characteristics and family background) as outputs. The 
analysis of the determinants of efficiency indicates that a high level of municipal revenue, a 
high degree of party fragmentation, and a high share of socialists in the local council are 
associated with low educational efficiency. The negative effects of the share of socialists and 
party fragmentation seem to reflect both higher resource use and lower student performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The educational sector has received substantial attention in the academic and political debate 
in recent years. International knowledge tests have provided new and easy accessible 
information that facilitates a comparison of educational performance across countries. A key 
finding is that the international tests indicate a negative correlation between student 
performance and resource use, meaning that the richest countries who allocate most resources 
to the educational sector, do not receive high achievement in return. Norway, which is a rich 
country with high resource use and (at best) average student performance, is no exception 
from this “rule”. The mismatch between resource use and performance has triggered a 
political debate regarding resource use, curriculum and the organization of the school sector. 
Actions are taken to increase the number of hours in basic subjects, to provide better 
information on the performance of individual schools and to open up for more competition 
from private schools. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency potential in the lower secondary school 
sector in Norway. The efficiency potential is not identified by comparing Norway to other 
countries, but rather by comparing performance and resource use among Norwegian schools. 
Our aim is to calculate the gain that can be achieved if all municipalities operated their school 
sector according to the best Norwegian practice. The analysis is related to a large literature, 
starting with Bessant et al (1982) and summarized by Worthington (2001), that applies Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to the educational sector. To our knowledge this is the first 




Compared to the existing international literature we make two contributions. The first relates 
to the handling of family background as indicator of the quality of the students. We take 
advantage of a rich data set of more than 100,000 students containing grades and extensive 
information on family background to estimate a measure on student performance adjusted for 
variation in family background. It is these adjusted grades, rather than the raw grades, that are 
used as outputs in the DEA analysis. The advantages by this approach is that the inputs in the 
DEA analysis can be restricted to factors under direct control of the educational institution 
                                                 
1 Bonesrønning and Rattsø (1994) analyze Norwegian high schools using grades as output.   3
and that differences in family background are taken into account in the calculation of the 
efficiency potential. The second contribution is that we provide an extensive analysis of 
variation in efficiency scores along the lines of Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1997) and 
Grosskopf et al (2001). We investigate the impact of political and budgetary institutions of the 
municipality, along with traditional variables like school size. 
 
In Norway primary and lower secondary educations is mainly a municipal responsibility, and 
the municipalities are the units of observations in this study. The DEA analysis reveals large 
variations in efficiency across municipalities, and the average efficiency potential is 
calculated to 14 percent. The variation in efficiency is analyzed using TOBIT regression, 
which indicates that a high level of revenue, a high degree of party fragmentation, and a high 
share of socialists in the local council are associated with low educational efficiency. The 
negative effects of the share of socialists and party fragmentation seem to reflect both higher 
resource use and lower student performance. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the necessary institutional 
background. The principles of DEA analysis and the approach taken in this paper are 
discussed in section 3, while section 4 discusses data and model specification. Section 5 
presents the findings of the DEA analysis and discusses the robustness of the results. Section 
6 is devoted to TOBIT analysis of the determinants of educational efficiency. Finally, section 
7 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
Most primary and lower secondary schools in Norway are owned and operated by the 
municipalities. Private schools account for less than 2 percent of the students, and until the 
school year 2003/04 the few private schools were either religious schools or schools that use 
alternative educational methods. In 2003 the parliament passed a new law on private schools 
which allows for non-religious private schools that use traditional educational methods. This 
study is based on data for the school years 2001/02 and 2002/03 and do only include 
municipal schools. 
   4
Norwegian municipalities are multi-purpose authorities that, in addition to education, are 
responsible for welfare services like child care, primary health care and care for the elderly. 
Other important tasks are culture and infrastructure. The main revenue sources are taxes (43 
percent of current revenue), block grants (21 percent), earmarked grants (13 percent) and user 
charges (16 percent). Interest and other revenue account for the rest. Since earmarked grants 
and user charges are practically non-existent in primary and lower secondary education, the 
sector is mainly financed by taxes and block grants. Compared to most other countries, the 
system of financing is quite centralized. Around 95 percent of local taxes are regulated 
income and wealth taxes where effective limits on tax rates have been in place for the last 25 
years. The opportunity to influence current revenues is limited to property tax and user 
charges. 
 
The municipalities enjoy more discretion on the spending side than on the revenue side. The 
allocation of taxes and block grants between different service sectors are decided locally, 
subject to national regulations and minimum standards. In the educational sector there is a 
national curriculum and minimum standards are determined by maximum class size and 
minimum number of hours per class in each subject. Moreover, until 2004 the teacher unions 
negotiated wage and work load (teaching hours per week) with the national government. 
Despite these national regulations, there is substantial variation in resource use per student 
between schools and between municipalities (see section 4). The variation across schools is 
too a large extent related to school size, and the variation between municipalities is related to 
the choice of school structure and thereby average school size. Settlement pattern, the number 
of students in the municipality and municipal revenue are important determinants of average 
school size. Few students and a decentralized settlement pattern tend to give small schools, 
and municipalities with high levels of revenue can afford a decentralized school structure with 
many small schools. 
 
 
3. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
 
In this section we introduce the concept of technical efficiency and use a simple case to 
illustrate how relative efficiency is calculated in the DEA procedure. We pay particular 
attention to the potential problems and challenges that arise when this method is applied to the 
educational sector.   5
 
Data envelopment analysis was first introduced by Charnes, Copper and Rhodes (1978) in 
order to calculate relative technical efficiency in the case of multiple inputs or outputs in the 
production process of non-profit actors, e.g. in the public sector. Technical efficiency is a 
normative concept and should be interpreted as the inputs or outputs compared to a standard 
or a norm, and the basic concept of the DEA procedure in this paper is to minimize the level 
of inputs for a given amount of outputs.
2 This is done by simultaneously solving a linear 
programming problem for each unit (schools or municipalities in our case). Generally 
municipalities (or schools) will value their inputs and outputs differently and thus call for 
different sets of weights in the conventional measure of relative efficiency.
3 The efficiency of 
a single municipality is calculated relative to a “best practice” reference frontier. This frontier 
is defined as a linear combination of the inputs and outputs of efficient municipalities in the 
sample. The weights and the efficiency measure for each municipality are identified 
simultaneously in the DEA procedure. The method requires no a priori specification of the 
functional form of the educational production function. 
 
We will now consider a simplified educational sector where the schools use only one input 
(teachers) to produce a single output (student achievement) to illustrate how this best practice 
reference frontier and the efficiency measures are determined in the DEA procedure. The 
simplification allows us to describe the production process in a simple two-dimensional 
diagram as in figure 1 below. The points A, B, C and K represents locations of different 
municipalities in the teacher (input) and student achievement (output) space. 
 
The DEA model originally proposed by Charnes, Coper and Rhodes (1978) was input 
oriented and allowed only for constant returns to scale. This approach has since then been 
widely developed, see e.g. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) where a variable return to 
scale specification was first proposed. We start out by considering the case with constant 
returns to scale. In figure 1 the efficiency frontier is then represented by the line OO’ passing 
through the origin and observation B in the diagram.
4 Observation B lies on the reference 
                                                 
2 Alternatively the efficiency may be calculated by maximizing the outputs for a given level of inputs. In this 
paper we focus only on input oriented technical efficiency. 
3 Conventionally relative efficiency is calculated as weighted outputs to weighted inputs with a common set of 
weights. 
4 When drawing a line from the origin trough the sample observations in figure 1, the line passing trough 
observation B has the greatest slope. Observation B is the most productive of the sample observations. All the 
other observations lie below this line.   6
frontier and is assumed to be fully efficient, while the observations that lie under the line OO’ 
are inefficient, e.g. observations A, C and K. Inefficiency implies that the observed units 
could have produced the same level of outputs by using less input given that they adapted the 
“best practice” technology defined by the reference frontier. The efficiency of a municipality 
depends on the distance to the efficiency frontier. In figure 1 the efficiency of observation K 
can be expressed as the ratio of efficient use of inputs to the actual use of inputs, this ratio is 
represented in the figure as the distance HI divided by the distance HK. For all observations 
situated below the efficiency frontier this ratio will lie between zero and one, while for 
observation B (the efficient municipality) the ratio is equal to one. 
 
Figure 1   
The best practice reference frontier under constant and variable return to scale 
 
If we consider variable returns to scale the reference frontier is represented by the piecewise 
linear curve passing trough the observations A, B and C in figure 1. In this case only 
observation K is situated below the efficiency frontier and is defined as ineffective. Given the 
output of municipality K the efficient amount of inputs is defined by point J in figure 1, and 
the relative efficiency (or efficiency score) is thus given by the ratio HJ/HK. It follows from 
figure 1 that the input- and output-oriented efficiency measures will be identical in the case of 
constant returns to scale, but will differ in the case of variable returns to scale. 
 
One property by the DEA method is that the number of efficient units and the calculated 
efficiency potential depends on the number of inputs and outputs relative to the sample size. 
For a given sample size an increase in the number of inputs and/or outputs will increase the 
















to formulate a proper model specification since an overspecified model (with many outputs 
and inputs) may underestimate the efficiency potential, whereas an underspecified model 
(with few outputs and inputs) may overestimate the efficiency potential. 
 
When the DEA method is applied to the education sector, it is a challenge to limit the number 
of variables. It is well documented that socioeconomic variables capturing family background 
are important determinants of student achievement (e.g. Hanushek, 1986), and the potential 
number of relevant variables describing the quality of student input is very large. In 
applications of DEA to the educational sector this problem is dealt with in two different ways; 
see Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese (1998) and Worthington (2001). The first is a two-stage 
procedure where only factors under direct control of the educational institution are included as 
inputs in a first-stage DEA analysis, and where variables capturing family background are 
included in a second stage TOBIT regression. The problem with this approach is that the 
efficiency scores from DEA analysis are biased because differences in family background are 
not taken into account. 
 
The second alternative is to include variables capturing family background as inputs in the 
DEA analysis to get unbiased efficiency scores. However, if it is necessary to include a large 
number of socioeconomic input variables, the efficiency scores may be biased because the 
number of inputs and outputs becomes large relative to the sample size. The practical solution 
is to include a few variables or to construct an index of the socioeconomic environment (e.g. 
Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero, 1997). In this case the remaining question is whether family 
background is sufficiently controlled for. 
 
In this paper we propose a third alternative where we utilize a rich dataset of more than 
100,000 10th graders containing information on grades, student characteristics and family 
background. We estimate regressions with individual grades as dependent variable and 
variables capturing family background as explanatory variables. In addition a full set of 
dummy variables for each municipality is included. The estimates of the municipal dummy 
variables, which may be interpreted as grades adjusted for family background, are used as 
outputs in the DEA analysis. The advantages by this approach is that the inputs in the DEA 
analysis can be restricted to factors under direct control of the educational institution and that 
that a large set of variables describing family background can be taken into account in the 
calculation of the efficiency potential. Moreover, it is not necessary to decide ex ante whether   8
each socioeconomic variable has a positive or negative effect on achievement as is necessary 
when the variables are included as inputs in the DEA analysis. A similar approach is used by 
Grosskopf et al (2001) where output is based on value added residuals from a regression with 
current test scores as dependent variable and previous test scores and the socioeconomic 
composition of the student body as explanatory variables. However, they do not use data for 
individual students and do only control for a few socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
Another potential problem is that the DEA method is sensitive to measurement error and 
outliers that tend to overestimate the efficiency potential. The reason is that outliers with high 
levels of output and/or low input use will affect the position of the frontier and thereby reduce 
the efficiency score of other units. Outliers with low levels of output and/or high input will 
only have a minor impact since they only affect average efficiency by making themselves less 
efficient. 
 
In the empirical analysis we use adjusted grades as outputs. In small schools and small 
municipalities in particular, average grades may vary from year to year reflecting 
(unobservable) variation in the quality of the student population. As a consequence the 
efficiency potential may be overestimated because the frontier is determined by the units with 
high quality students. In the empirical analysis we try to reduce this problem by using data 
that is averaged over two school years. Controlling for student characteristics and family 
background as discussed above also helps to reduce the problem with variation in student 
quality. In addition we perform jackknifing to investigate whether the results are sensitive to 
outliers and measurement error. 
 
 
4. Data and specification of the educational production function 
 
Most applications of DEA to the educational sector use grades or test scores as outputs. We 
follow this tradition by constructing output measures based on grades in the core subjects 
Norwegian, mathematics and English, as well as the average grade in other subjects, at the 
end of lower secondary school. All students get assessment grades based on class work during 
the three years (8th to 10th grade) of lower secondary education. In the final year there are 
written national exams in the core subjects, but each student does not take more than one   9
exam. Even at the municipal level there are many cases where all three core subjects are not 
covered by national exams.  
 
The point of departure is the assessment grades in the 10th grade for the school year 2001/02 
and 2002/03. Some descriptive statistics for the mean assessment grades are given in the 
appendix table A1. Grades are given on a 1-6 scale where 6 is the best. In Norwegian the 
grade varies from 2.9 in the municipality with the lowest grade to 4.8 in the municipality with 
the highest grade, and with a mean of 3.8. The mean grade is somewhat lower in mathematics 
than in Norwegian and English, but the variation across municipalities is of roughly the same 
magnitude in the three subjects. 
 
As discussed in section 3, we utilize a rich data set of more than 100,000 10th graders to 
construct grades that are adjusted for family background. The data set contains individual 
assessment grades and information on socioeconomic background for 52,713 students for the 
academic year 2001/2002 and for 53,593 students for the academic year 2002/2003. This rich 
data set enables us to adjust the grades for family background, and the adjustment is done by 
performing a regression of the following type 
 
ijt ijt t j ijt yx u β γα =+ + +                                                                                                (1) 
 
where  ijt y  is the assessment grade of student i in municipality j in school year t. The vector x 
captures student characteristics and family background  t γ  is a year specific constant term,  j α  
municipal fixed effects and  ijt u  an error term. The α ’s may be interpreted as the average 
grade in the municipality adjusted for family background. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated for each of the three core subjects Norwegian, English and 
mathematics, and for the average grade of the remaining subjects. The x vector contains 
variables that are typically used in analyses of student achievement.
5 The x-vector includes a 
number of individual dummy variables on the student’s gender, quarter of birth (given that 
they graduated in the year they turn 16), graduation earlier or later than expected, and whether 
they are immigrants or adopted. Family background is captured by parents’ education and 
                                                 
5 See Hægeland, Raaum and Salvanes (2004) for a more detailed examination of the data.   10
income (separate for the mother and the father) and dummy variables reflecting whether the 
parents are married to each other, cohabitants, separated, divorced or neither of these cases. 
We do not have information on whether individual students receive adapted teaching due to 
learning disabilities, only the fraction of students at each school that receive such teaching. 
This fraction, labeled the fraction of students with special needs is also included in x. The 
appendix table A2 reports descriptive statistics for the x variables, while the regression results 
are reported in table A3. 
 
The estimation results reported in table A3 mainly serves to control students achievement for 
the available variables capturing family background, and the estimated coefficients do to a 
great extent confirm the findings from other analyses on the impact of family background on 
student achievement, see Hægeland, Raaum and Salvanes (2004) for a recent Norwegian 
analysis and Hanushek (2002) for a survey of international contributions. Briefly we find that 
parental educational level and income have positive and highly significant effects on student 
achievement, while immigrants have significantly lower achievement levels. Students living 
with both parents (either as married or cohabitants) receive better grades than students living 
with one of their parents (single, separated or divorced). The estimated effect of the share of 
students receiving adapted teaching at the student’s school is significantly negative and 




Descriptive statistics adjusted assessment grades, teacher hours per student and the fraction 
of certified teachers 
 Mean  Coefficient 
of variation 
Min Max 
Adjusted  assessment  grades      
   Norwegian  3.55  0.05  2.94  4.34 
   English  3.53  0.05  3.04  4.19 
   Mathematics  3.54  0.05  2.99  4.42 
   Other subjects  3.54  0.04  3.14  4.16 
      
Teacher hours per student  96.2  0.28  61.3  226.2 
The fraction of certified teachers  0.95  0.06  0.69  1.00 
Notes: The figures are based on data for 426 municipalities. The reported means are unweighted averages. 
 
The average value of the estimated municipal fixed effects (the α ’s) are close to zero, and are 
not directly comparable to the original grades that are on a 1-6 scale. They are made   11
comparable by adding 3.5 to the α ’s.
6 These adjusted grades are reported in table 1. It 
appears that the variation in adjusted grades is slightly less than the variation in the original 
grades, which indicates that the adjustment has the expected effect: Municipalities with low 
grades and poor socioeconomic status are lifted up, whereas municipalities with high grades 
and good socioeconomic status are leveled down. 
 
The input measures we use are based on the total number of teacher hours and the fraction of 
certified teachers (meaning that they have certified education for the relevant grade level). 
Table 1 documents a substantial variation in teacher hours per student across municipalities, 
from a low of 62 hours per student to a high of 279 hours per student. On average only 5 
percent of the teachers are non-certified, but in individual municipalities up to about 30 
percent of the teaching staff are non-certified. 
 
Table 2 displays the correlations between grades and teachers hours per pupil and the fraction 
of certified teachers. It appears that the four output measures are positively correlated. The 
correlations between the adjusted assessment grades in the different subjects are in the range 
0.4-0.7. Teacher hours per student are positively correlated with adjusted assessment grades, 
whereas the fraction of certified teachers is only weakly correlated with the four outputs. The 
positive correlation between adjusted grades and teacher hours per pupil is consistent with the 
results of Hægeland, Raaum and Salvanes (2004). They find a positive (but modest) effect of 
teacher hours per pupil on assessment grades after family background is controlled for. 
 
Table 2  
Correlation matrix for adjusted grades, teacher hours per pupil and the fraction of qualified 
teachers 








Norwegian  1.000         
English  0.603  1.000       
Mathematics 0.507  0.421  1.000     
Other  subjects  0.692  0.622 0.607 1.000     
Teacher hours  
per student 
0.311  0.319 0.287 0.391  1.000   
Share of certified  
teachers 
-0.079 -0.089  0.006  -0.092 -0.241 1.000 
                                                 
6 The municipal fixed effects also need to be transformed (to be greater than zero) in order to be used as outputs 
in the DEA analysis. By adding 3.5 this requirement is fulfilled.   12
 
 
In the DEA analysis we use two specifications of the educational production. They have the 
same specification of inputs, but differ in the specification of outputs. As student 
characteristics and family background are controlled for in the calculation of adjusted 
assessment grades, only factors under municipal control are included as inputs. The two 
inputs that are included are the number of teacher hours given by certified and non-certified 
teachers respectively. The two models differ in the specification of outputs. In the first model 
(A) the adjusted grades in the core subjects Norwegian, English and Mathematics are used as 
outputs. The second model (B) extends model A by including grades in other subjects than the 
three core subjects. The outputs are specified as the adjusted grades multiplied by the number 
of students.
7 In both specifications we allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). Moreover, 
we focus on input oriented efficiency scores because the number of students, which is an 
important element of the output measures, is largely beyond municipal control. The analysis is 
based on 426 (out of 434) municipalities. 
 
 
5. Educational efficiency: The results of the DEA analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores from model A and B are reported in table 3. In 
model A the mean efficiency score is 0.78 when all municipalities are given equal weight, i.e. 
the average municipality could reduce inputs by 22 percent without reducing measured 
output. The results are similar to the US studies by Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1997) 
and Grosskopf et al (2001). Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero calculate an average efficiency 
score of 0.76 in their study of New York states school districts, whereas Grosskopf et al 
(analyzing public schools in Texas) find that inputs could be reduced by roughly 20 percent 
without reducing output. Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) find average efficiency of 0.82-
0.84 in an analysis of senior secondary schools in Finland. 
 
However, it is the weighted average of the efficiency score (with the number of students as 
weights) that reflects the national efficiency potential. The weighted average is 0.86, which 
yields an efficiency potential of 14 percent. The calculated efficiency potential reflects 
                                                 
7 The data on the teacher hours and students only separate between primary schools (1st to 7th grade) and lower 
secondary schools (8th to 10th grade). In the analysis the number of teacher hours and students refer to the lower 
secondary level.   13
substantial variation in efficiency score across municipalities. 19 out of 426 municipalities 
come out as efficient (with an efficiency score of 1), whereas the lowest efficiency score is 
0.42. Around 25 percent of the municipalities come out with an efficiency score below 0.71, 
and other 25 percent have efficiency score above 0.87. 
 
Model B, which also includes average grades in other subjects as output, gives more or less 
the same results as model A. The calculated efficiency potential is slightly reduced, from 14 
percent to 13.6 percent. The ranking of the municipalities is also largely unaltered as the rank 
correlation is as high as 0.997. The robustness of the results indicates that good performance 
in core subjects does not come at expense of performance in other subjects, and that we do not 
lose much by focusing on the core subjects. 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the calculated efficiency scores 








st quartile  3
rd quartile 
Model A  19  0.784  0,860  0.424  0.707  0.873 
Model B  20  0.787  0.864  0.424  0.708  0.878 
 
We have also investigated whether the results from model A are robust to measurement errors 
and outliers by performing jackknifing. Jackknifing means that we leave out each efficient 
municipality one at a time. Then we run a new DEA analysis in each case. In our case with 19 
effective municipalities, 19 additional DEA analyses are run. When one effective unit is left 
out, the mean efficiency score of the remaining units will generally increase.
8 The evaluation 
is by how much mean efficiency increases. The results from these 19 additional DEA analyses 
are reported in the appendix table A4. It turns out that the benchmark efficiency scores are 
very robust to outliers as mean efficiency increases by one percentage point or less in 17 of 
the 19 cases. In the last cases the increase is slightly above one percentage points. The rank 
correlation with the efficiency scores from model A and the various jack-knife models varies 
between 0.97 and 1. 
 
Table 4 provides more information about grades and teachers hours per student in the efficient 
municipalities (from model A), and they are also compared with all municipalities with 
                                                 
8 Mean efficiency fro the remaining units is unaffected if the unit that is left out is not a reference for any 
ineffective unit.   14
roughly the same number of students. The efficient municipalities are divided in three groups; 
i) municipalities with 45-85 students, ii) municipalities with 190-400 students and iii) 
municipalities with 700-1400 students. The table does not include the four smallest efficient 
municipalities and the three largest efficient municipalities as they can not be compared with 
inefficient municipalities with a similar number of students. 
 
Table 5 
Describing the efficient municipalities from model A 
  
Adjusted assessment grades 




Municipalities with 45-85 students         
     EM1 (48 students)  3.59  3.61  3.91  85.3 
     EM2 (53 students)  3.67  3.46  3.64  91.8 
     EM3(80 students)  3.78  3.85  3.85  88.2 
     EM4 (82 students)  3.81  3.89  3.95  98.5 
     Mean for the rest of the group  3.57  3.58  3.59  117.7 
        
Municipalities with 190-400 students         
     EM5 (196 students)  3.52  3.53  3.50  64.3 
     EM6 (201 students)  3.91  3.56  3.64  69.0 
     EM7 (252 students)  3.91  3.56  3.64  69.0 
     EM8 (388 students)  3.57  3.74  3.53  61.4 
     Mean for the rest of the group  3.52  3.53  3.52  85.0 
        
Municipalities with 700-1400 students         
     EM9 (704 students)  3.40  3.34  3.37  63.2 
     EM10 (835 students)  3.56  3.54  3.39  62.5 
     EM11 (905 students)  3.40  3.46  3.51  61.3 
     EM12 (1375 students)  3.41  3.43  3.63  72.4 
     Mean for the rest of the group  3.53  3.52  3.53  84.3 
 
The four efficient municipalities in the group with 45-85 students (EM1–EM4) are 
characterized by both high grades and low resource use per student. Their grades are on 
average 3-7 percent above the mean of all other municipalities in the group, and the number 
of teacher hours per student is 22 percent below. Also in the group with 190-400 students the 
best performing municipalities (EM5-EM8) are characterized by high grades and low resource 
use. Grades are on average 1-5 percent higher than the mean of the group and teacher hours 
per student 22 percent lower. In the largest group (700-1400 students) the efficient 
municipalities (EM9-EM12) do not have better grades than the mean of the group, but come 
out as efficient because they have low resource use per student. 
   15
The characterization of the efficient municipalities is different from Duncombe, Miner and 
Ruggiero (1997). They find that efficient New York State school districts are characterized by 
high resource use (expenditures per student) that pays off in terms of high student 
performance. In the Norwegian case efficient municipalities are rather characterized by low 
resource use, but where the low resource is not associated with low student performance. 
 
 
6. Explaining variation in educational efficiency 
 
As noted by Worthington (2001, p. 265) efforts to explain variation in educational efficiency 
are underdeveloped. Most studies merely compare efficiency scores in different groups of the 
sample. Among the few studies attempting to explain variation in educational efficiency are 
Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1997) and Grosskopf et al (2001) that focuses on 
monitoring and competition between school districts. In this section we try to explain 
variations in educational efficiency along the lines of earlier studies of efficiency in 
Norwegian municipalities that focuses on political and budgetary institutions. The earlier 
studies include Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) who analyze administrative spending, Kalseth 
(2003) who analyzes the care for the elderly sector, and Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2005) who 
analyze all service sectors simultaneously. 
 
With regard to political institutions several studies of Norwegian municipalities have 
emphasized the impact of political strength. There is evidence that political strength 
contributes to lower user charges (Borge, 2000) and to lower budget deficits (Borge, 2005). 
One interpretation of these findings is that a strong political leadership has an advantage in 
opposing pressure from external interest groups to increase spending (which in turn has to be 
financed by higher user charges and/or higher budget deficits). Moreover, political strength is 
shown to reduce administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998) and to increase 
efficiency (Kalseth, 2003, and Borge, Falch and Tovmo, 2005), which indicates that a strong 
political leadership also has an advantage in opposing internal pressure to increase budgetary 
slack. A traditional Herfindahl-index has been the most widely used indicator of political 










=∑ ,                                                                                                         (2)   16
 
where  p SH  is the share of representatives from party p. The index takes the maximum value 
of 1 when a single party holds all the seats in the local council, while the minimum value of 
1/P is attained when the seats are equally divided among the P parties. The Herfindahl-index 
is inversely related to the degree of party fragmentation in the local council and thereby 
positively related to strength. We expect the Herfindahl-index to have a positive impact on 
efficiency.  
 
In Norway the socialist camp is dominated by the Labor Party, while the non-socialist camp is 
more fragmented. As a consequence, there is a positive correlation between the Herfindahl-
index and the share of socialists in the local council. There is then an argument to include the 
share of socialists in the analysis to get an unbiased estimate of the Herfindahl-index. More 
substantial arguments are that earlier studies document that a high share of socialists are 
associated with high administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998), low efficiency in the 
care for the elderly sector (Kalseth, 2003) and low overall efficiency (Borge, Falch and 
Tovmo, 2005). A possible explanation for these results is that it might be harder for socialists 
to impose a hard budget constraint on the service producers because they are more concerned 
about service quality. 
 
When it comes to budgetary procedures, we distinguish between centralized (top down) and 
decentralized (bottom up) procedures in the initial phases of the budget process. A centralized 
budgetary procedure is characterized by the head of the administration (administrative 
centralized procedure) or the executive board (political centralized procedure) presenting an 
overall budget proposal for each sector, and the sectors only work out specific details within 
their sector. A decentralized or fragmented budgetary procedure is on the other hand 
characterized by each sector working out heir own budget proposals, while the head of the 
administration or the executive board coordinates an overall budget proposal to be approved 
by the local council. Tovmo (2005) finds that a centralized budgetary contributes to lower 
budget deficits, while Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2005) find no significant effect on overall 
efficiency. 
 
The earlier studies (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998, Kalseth, 2003, and Borge, Falch and Tovmo, 
2005) also indicate that high levels of local government revenue are associated with low   17
efficiency. The underlying argument may be that the service producing agencies are able to 
take advantage of “a rich sponsor” by enjoying more budgetary slack. As indicator of 
municipal revenue we use local taxes and block grants per capita deflated by an index that 
captures varying cost conditions across local governments. This revenue indicator is widely 
accepted as the most reliable indicator of differences in economic conditions across local 
governments. 
 
The determinants of educational efficiency are analyzed using TOBIT regressions. This is an 
appropriate method since the dependent variable, the calculated efficiency score from the 
DEA analysis, is censored at 1. The regression results are presented in table 5, where we in 
the three first columns use the efficiency scores from model A as dependent variable and in 
the final column the efficiency scores from model B.  
 
Table 5 
The determinants of educational efficiency 
 I  II  III  IV 
-0.053       The level of education in the 
municipality (0.40)       
-0.221       The share of minority students 
 (0.93)       
-0.896 -0.799 -0.780 -0.788  The share of students with special needs 
(5.18) (3.76) (4.37) (4.41) 
0.081 0.114      Average school size (in 100) 
 (4.23)  (4.49)     
-0.006 -0.012      School size squared 
 (1.30)  (2.07)     
  -0.033 -0.124 -0.126  Municipal revenue 
    (0.99) (4.54) (4.60) 
  0.349 0.201 0.199  Herfindahl-index of (the inverse) of 
party  fragmentation    (3.70) (2.76) (2.74) 
  -0.126 -0.123 -0.125  The share of socialists in the local 
council    (2.51) (2.93) (2.98) 
   0.002  0.002  Population size (in 1000) 
     (3.91)  (3.90) 
   -0.078  -0.080  The share of the population living in 
rural areas      (3.05)  (3.13) 
 -0.018     Centralized budgetary procedure 
   (1.10)     
        
Efficiency scores  Model A  Model A  Model A  Model B 
Log  likelihood  302.2 219.3 293.1 290.7 
Observations  426 306 426 426 
Note: TOBIT-estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses.   18
 
The first regression (I) disregards the possible impact of political and budgetary institutions 
discussed above, and is primarily a test of our method of controlling for family background. It 
includes the level of education in the municipality, the share of students with special needs 
and the share of minority students and the level of education in the municipality. In addition 
we follow earlier studies of educational efficiency by including average school size. 
 
The level of education and the share of minority students come out insignificant, which 
indicate that our approach of controlling for family background and student characteristics 
works well.
9 On the other hand, the share of student with special needs comes out as 
significant, and a large share of students with special needs is associated with low efficiency. 
The significant effect of the share of students with special needs might reflect the lack of the 
data on the individual level (see section 4). School size has a significantly positive effect on 
efficiency, while school size squared has a negative effect. However, the impact of school size 
does not reflect economies of scale since variable returns to scale is allowed for in the 
underlying DEA analysis. It rather reflects that the variation in efficiency across 
municipalities is related to average school size, and more precisely that the variation is larger 
among the local governments with small schools. 
 
In the second column we include municipal revenue as well as political and budgetary 
variables. In line with the earlier studies we find a negative and significant relationship 
between efficiency and the share of socialist and the degree of fragmentation in the local 
council, whereas the budgetary procedure does not seem to have any significant impact on 
efficiency.  
 
However, in contrast to the earlier studies the analysis does not produce a significant effect of 
municipal revenue. One might suspect that the reason for this discrepancy is that a high level 
of revenue is associated with a decentralized school structure, and the impact of revenue is 
captured by school size in regressions I-II. The suspicion is confirmed by regression III where 
we exclude the school size variables and rather include three background variables explaining 
school structure. These variables are municipal revenues, population size and settlement 
pattern. The settlement pattern is captured by the fraction of the population living in rural 
                                                 
9 Both variables come out as highly significant when they are regressed on the efficiency score from a DEA 
model where the raw assessment grades are used as outputs instead of the adjusted assessment grades.   19
areas. In this case municipal revenue comes out negative and significant in line with the 
earlier Norwegian studies. Population size and settlement patterns also come out as significant 
with the expected sign, i.e. small and sparsely populated communities tend to have low 
efficiency. The sign and significance of the political variables are robust to this modification 
of the model specification, but the quantitative effect of the Herfindahl-index is somewhat 
reduced. 
 
In the final column (IV) we use the efficiency scores from model B instead of the efficiency 
scores from model A as dependent variable. I turns out that the estimated coefficients are 
more or less identical to those of column III. In fact, this is no surprise given the high 
correlation between the efficiency scores from the two models.  
 
Table 6 
The determinants of adjusted grades and teacher hours per student 
  Average 
adjusted grades 





































Inverse number of students in local 
council 
   1  948 
(16.36) 
The share of the population living 
in rural areas 
   8.655 
(2.59) 
     
Observations  426 426 426 
R-squared  0.07 0.08 0.66 
Note: OLS-estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses. 
 
In table 6 we investigate how party fragmentation, the share of socialists and municipal 
revenue affect efficiency. Does the negative impact on efficiency reflect high resource use, 
high student performance, or both? The issue is investigated by running simple regressions 
with average adjusted assessment grades and teacher hours per student as dependent variables, 
and with party fragmentation, the share of socialists and municipal revenue as explanatory 
variables. In addition the share of students with special needs is included in both equations.   20
The inverse number of students and the share of the population living in rural areas are 
included in the teacher hours per student equation. 
 
The results indicate that municipal revenue affects efficiency in a different way than the 
political variables. A high level of municipal revenue contributes to both high student 
performance and high resource use per student. However, we know from Table 5 that the 
impact of increased resource use dominates the impact of higher performance, i.e. a high level 
of municipal revenue contributes to low educational efficiency. For the political variables the 
impacts on resource use and performance work in the same direction. A high degree of party 
fragmentation and a high degree of socialists contribute to both increased resource use and to 
lower performance. The share of socialists is highly significant in all three equations, whereas 
the Herfindahl index is significant in the equation for adjusted grade in other subjects and 




7. Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this paper was to calculate the efficiency potential in the lower secondary 
school sector in Norway and to analyze the efficiency variation across municipalities. In a 
DEA analysis, with assessment grades adjusted for family background as outputs and teacher 
hours as inputs, the national efficiency potential was calculated to 14 percent. The calculated 
efficiency potential is fairly robust to outliers. Based on a comparison of municipalities with 
roughly the same number of students we find that the efficient municipalities from the DEA 
analysis are characterized by relatively low resource use per student, and (except for the 
largest municipalities) they also have relatively better student performance.  
 
In a second a stage analysis we ran TOBIT regressions in order to explain the variations in 
efficiency scores across municipalities. We find that a fragmented local council, a high share 
of socialists and a high level of municipal revenue are associated with low efficiency. In 
additional regressions we investigate how party fragmentation, the share of socialists and the 
level of municipal revenue affects efficiency, i.e. does the negative impact on efficiency 
reflect high resource use per student, low student performance, or both? For party 
fragmentation and the share of socialist we find that the negative impact on efficiency reflects 
both higher resource use per student and lower student performance. Higher municipal   21
revenue contributes both to high student performance and to high resource use per student, but 
the overall effect is to reduce efficiency. 
 
 
8. Appendix tables 
 
Table A1 
Descriptive statistics assessment grades 
  Mean  Coefficient 
of variation  Min Max 
School year 2001/02         
   Norwegian  3.81  0.06  3.00  4.83 
   English  3.69  0.07  2.73  4.73 
   Mathematics  3.44  0.08  2.29  4.45 
   Other subjects  4.02  0.05  3.33  4.78 
      
School year 2002/03         
   Norwegian  3.83  0.06  3.00  4.75 
   English  3.69  0.06  2.83  4.56 
   Mathematics  3.46  0.07  2.67  4.33 
   Other subjects  4.04  0.05  3.74  4.76 
Note: The figures are based on data for 426 municipalities. The reported means are unweighted averages.   22
Table A2 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the student level regressions 




(st.dev)  Min Max # of 
obs. 
Mean 
(st.dev)  Min Max # of 
obs. 
Girl   0.472 
(0.499)  0 1  51,098  0.4926 
(0.500)  0 1  52,928 
Immigrant 0.086 
(0.280)  0 1  51,098  0.0626 
(0.242)  0 1  52,928 
Adopted 0.009 
(0.095)  0 1  51,098  0.0090 
(0.094)  0 1  52,928 
Father’s highest 
education is 
 upper secondary 
0.572 
(0.495)  0 1  51,098  0.5751 
(0.494)  0 1  52,928 
Father’s highest 
education is  
lower tertiary 
0.179 
(0.383)  0 1  51,098  0.1778 
(0.382)  0 1  52,928 
Father’s highest 
education is upper 
tertiary 
0.093 
(0.290)  0 1  51,098  0.0884 
(0.284)  0 1  52,928 
Mother’s highest 
education is upper 
secondary 
0.581 
(0.493)  0 1  51,098  0.5804 
(0.493)  0 1  52,928 
Mother’s highest 
education is  
lower tertiary 
0.257 
(0.437)  0 1  51,098  0.2562 
(0.437)  0 1  52,928 




(0.178)  0 1  51,098  0.0337 
(0.180)  0 1  52,928 
Student born in second 
quarter  
0.261 
(0.439)  0 1  51,098  0.2603 
(0.439)  0 1  52,928 
Student born in third 
quarter   
0.256 
(0.436)  0 1  51,098  0.2539 
(0.435)  0 1  52,928 
Student born in fourth 
quarter  
0.220 
(0.414)  0 1  51,098  0.2257 
(0.418)  0 1  52,928 
Student born earlier than 
its cohort 
0.009 
(0.095)  0 1  51,098  0.0083 
(0.090)  0 1  52,928 
Student born later than its 
cohort 
0.017 
(0.127)  0 1  51,098  0.0165 
(0.127)  0 1  52,928 
Parents living together as 
married 
0.644 
(0.479)  0 1  51,098  0.6234 
(0.485)  0 1  52,928 
Parents are cohabitants  0.043 
(0.204)  0 1  51,098  0.0488 
(0.215)  0 1  52,928 
Parents separated  0.032 
(0.177)  0 1  51,098  0.0340 
(0.181)  0 1  52,928 
Parents divorced  0.093 
(0.290)  0 1  51,098  0.0928 
(0.290)  0 1  52,928 
Single mother  0.193 
(0.395)  0 1  51,098  0.1979 
(0.398)  0 1  52,928 
Father’s income (in 
100.000 NOK) 
4.205 
(5.570)  0  622.3
9  49,079  4.536 
(9.883)  0 167.00  50,632 
Mother’s income (in 100 
000NOK) 
2.313 
(1.805)  0  123.2
2  50,579  2.511 
(3.407)  0 39.30  52,387 
Share of students 
receiving adapted 
teaching at the school 
0.068 
(0.032)  0.435 1 1,102  0.069 
(0.036)  0 1  1,079 
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Table A3 
The determinants of individual assessment grades 
 English  Norwegian  Mathematics  Other  subjects 
0.011 0.027 0.022 0.026  Year effect: dummy equals one when 
year is 2002/2003  (1.70) (4.97) (3.34) (5.78) 
0.471 0.636 0.141 0.445  Girl 
(75.73) (116.74) (21.78) (100.30) 
-0.188 -0.156 -0.262 -0.178  Immigrant 
(13.38) (12.76) (18.04) (16.83) 
-0.311 -0.258 -0.575 -0.281  Adopted 
(9.57) (9.08)  (16.94)  (12.34) 
0.218 0.189 0.257 0.190  Father’s highest education is upper 
secondary  (22.73) (22.61) (25.86) (27.23) 
0.578 0.509 0.641 0.464  Father’s highest education is lower 
tertiary  (48.72) (48.95) (51.92) (53.99) 
0.713 0.613 0.804 0.543  Father’s highest education is upper 
tertiary  (48.22) (47.29) (52.25) (50.98) 
0.276 0.254 0.318 0.244  Mother’s highest education is upper 
secondary  (26.89) (28.35) (29.84) (32.75) 
0.637 0.601 0.702 0.537  Mother’s highest education is lower 
tertiary  (53.41) (57.66) (56.71) (62.37) 
0.814 0.735 0.918 0.629  Mother highest education is upper 
tertiary  (38.67) (39.71) (41.84) (41.64) 
-0.029 -0.042 -0.042 -0.026  Student born in second quarter  
(3.33) (5.47) (4.54) (4.14) 
-0.068 -0.088 -0.090 -0.075  Student born in third quarter 
(7.69) (11.36) (9.81) (11.89) 
-0.123 -0.146 -0.136 -0.117  Student born in fourth quarter  
(13.48 (18.22 (14.33)  (17.99) 
0.341 0.160 0.291 0.125  Student born earlier than 1986/1987 
(10.08) (5.36)  (8.24) (5.11) 
-0.547 -0.418 -0.496 -0.384  Student born later than 1986/1987 
  (19.10) (17.25) (17.19) (19.26) 
0.230 0.257 0.383 0.316  Parents living together as married 
  (23.17) (29.52) (37.07) (44.76) 
0.138 0.144 0.229 0.180  Parents are cohabitants 
  (8.70) (10.35)  (13.88)  (15.95) 
0.020 0.056 0.093 0.055  Parents separated 
  (0.92) (2.95) (4.15) (3.55) 
0.007 0.033 0.050 0.027  Parents divorced 
  (0.41) (2.23) (2.88) (2.25) 
0.027 -0.026 -0.035  -0.015  Single mother 
  (1.66) (1.82) (2.09) (1.35) 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002  Father’s income (in 100.000 NOK) 
(5.17) (5.22) (6.71) (7.06) 
0.008 0.006 0.009 0.008  Mother’s income (in 100.000 NOK) 
(6.88) (5.74) (7.04) (9.29) 
-0.386 0.043 -0.515  -0.203  Share of students receiving adapted 
teaching at the school  (2.93) (0.37) (3.76) (2.16) 
        
Jurisdiction fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
#  obs.  97,487 98,652 98,504 98,007 
R-squared  0.21 0.27 0.21 0.28 
Note: OLS-estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses.   24
Table A4 
Jackknifing results 






1 425  0.794  0.121  0.428  1 
2 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
3 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
4 425  0.783  0.121  0.424  1 
5 425  0.789  0.124  0.424  1 
6 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
7 425  0.787  0.122  0.424  1 
8 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
9 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
10 425  0.784  0.121  0.425  1 
11 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
12 425  0.795  0.119  0.424  1 
13 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
14 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
15 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
16 425  0.784  0.121  0.424  1 
17 425  0.784  0.122  0.424  1 
18 425  0.785  0.121  0.427  1 





Descriptive statistics for the variables in the TOBIT regressions 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum value  Maximum value 
The level of education in the municipality  0.167  0.049  0.079  0.422 
The share of minority students 
 
0.027 0.023  0  0.184 
The share of students with special needs  0.073  0.031  0  0.176 
Average school size (in 100) 
 
1.546 1.010 0.110 4.826 
Municipal revenue 
 
1.039 0.214 0.880 3.180 
Herfindahl-index of (the inverse) of party 
fragmentation 
0.266 0.087 0.140  1 
The share of socialists in the local council  0.366  0.141  0  0.846 
The share of the population living in rural 
areas 
0.486 0.267 0.004 0.997 
The share of the population living in rural 
areas 
10.546 30.180  0.348 512.093 
Centralized budgetary procedure 
 
0.831 0.373  0  1 
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